Review: Atul Kohli, ‘Imperialism and the Developing World’
Politics, Economics and Culture: How British and American Imperialisms Shaped the Developing World
Review of Atul Kohli’s Imperialism and the Developing World: How Britain and the United States Shaped the Global Periphery (Oxford University Press, 2020), 552 pages.
Abstract
Why do imperial powers imperialize? This is the question that Atul Kohli poses and sets out to answer in this book. The focus of the book is on British and American imperialisms that dominated the nineteenth and twentieth centuries respectively, and the main argument is that both imperialisms were driven largely by economic interests. The mechanism by which these interests were maintained shaped nations on the periphery. The question therefore is, given the considerable extant scholarship on Western imperialism in general, what new light does the book shine on imperialism studies?
Reviewed by Gabriel O. Apata
Ever since John Hobson published his major work Imperialism: A Study in 1902, several theories of imperialism have followed, each attempting to explain the factors that drive imperial powers to imperialise. The early part of the twentieth century saw the Marxist school of thought dominate imperialism studies, including Hilferding (1909); Luxembourg (1913); Lenin, (1917) and many others. At the heart of these theories, albeit with few variations and emphasis, is the idea that capitalism is the main driver of imperialist expansionism – the construction of capitalist oligopoly (Hobson); the search for non-capitalist markets (Luxembourg); the highest phase of capitalism (Lenin). The twentieth century has witnessed an evolution in imperialism studies just as the nature of imperialism itself has changed in what was now a new world order. A roll call of distinguished authors, too many to mention, many of them Marxists, have made considerable contribution to the study of imperialism, including Cohen (1973[2014]), Harvey (2003); Hardt and Negri (2009). Many have retained the link between capitalism and imperialism but with certain additional factors such as politics, ideology, militarism and others thrown into the mix.
This brief preamble is intended to show that much has been written on Western imperialism over the past century, with many theorists pursuing roughly the same line of argument. Any new book on the subject must therefore have something new to add to the discourse and Atul Kohli’s new book Imperialism and the Developing World: How Britain and the United States Shaped The Global Periphery sets out to do precisely that. The author takes another look at the British and American imperialisms with a view to explaining how both have shaped the modern world. At 535 pages, the book is not a short read and the mass of material that the author has consulted runs into 127 pages. The book’s six chapters divide into two parts. The first part covers British imperialism that dominated much of the world in the nineteenth century, while the second part deals with American imperialism, the dominant world power of the twentieth century. The work is organised around three main themes. (1) What were the motives that drove both the British and American imperialisms? (2) What were the mechanisms by which both imperial systems were maintained? (3) What were the impacts of these operations on developing nations? Each chapter ends with a useful concluding summary, which is perhaps where to begin reading each chapter. Kohli takes a historical and analytical approach to this study, which is both the strength and weakness of the book.
First, the author defines imperialism as having to do with ‘situations in which powerful states seek to control the political and economic life of weaker states or people’ (391). He then distinguishes between formal and informal imperialisms. Formal imperialism involves direct occupation and sovereign governance of another state, as exemplified by colonialism, while informal imperialism extends sovereign power through indirect rule that strongly influences the affairs of other nations.
The historical narrative traces the origins of British imperialism to the entrepreneurial activities of companies such as the East India Company in India, and the Royal Niger Company in Nigeria. These companies were so profitable to their shareholders and to the British exchequer (through taxation) that political intervention became inevitable, which resulted in an expansionist policy that saw the mobilization of the considerable power of the British state to protect those interests. Thus, economic interests, Kohli argues, drove British imperialism.
Having established motive, Kohli moves on to his second thesis which is the mechanism by which Britain maintained its imperial operations. As though an axiom, the profitability of a territory determined the extent of imperial intervention, and here India and Nigeria are compared. India was immensely profitable to the British (the jewel in its crown) and for this reason benefited from arguably the greatest political, economic and military intervention. Britain not only sent her best people to run the Indian civil service (ICS) - making it one of the most professional bureaucracies in all the British colonies -, but it also established a strong military presence in that country, partly to protect and defend its interests, such as putting down insurrections and mutinies. Third, Britain invested heavily in infrastructure such as the railways – largely to facilitate the colonial operation as well as in education. Is this history novel? Hardly.
With regards to Africa, things were different. Here Nigeria is selected as a representative example of the way the British governed Africa. Like India, it all began in Africa with corporate incursion by the Royal Niger Company. But unlike India, ‘Africa was not that important to the Europeans’ (179). Really? This is a highly contestable claim given the exploitation of Africa’s vast natural resources. But that aside, Kohli reiterates that the search for markets and competition among Europeans drove British imperial expansionism in Africa. So, Britain sought to ‘run Nigeria on the cheap …through indirect rule’ (182). And to this end, it sent ‘duds’ to Nigeria to run the Nigerian civil service where attributes like ‘force of character’ rather than ‘brainpower’ was sufficient for recruitment (185). While the British practiced a ‘centralised direct rule in India’ as against a decentralised indirect rule in Africa (183). In effect the British left no ‘coherent armed force, or professional civil service’ in Nigeria (182) as well as a depleted economy.
The comparative study of both India and Nigeria suggests that the legacy of colonial rule was overall positive, since India appears to have benefited from a greater level of British intervention - a strong military force, a vibrant civil service and a viable network of infrastructure like the railways, while Nigeria, on the other hand, and by extension Africa, was left in a perilous state precisely because Britain did not commit wholeheartedly to its African colonies. But Kohli is far from making this claim since he further argues that the net effect of British involvement in both India and Nigeria was negative.
This takes us to the second part of the book, namely American imperialism in the twentieth century. As British imperial hegemony began to wane, after World War II, through decolonization, American imperialism took over and became the dominant world power. But the British model of imperialism of the nineteenth century was no longer a viable model, yet the same principles of imperialism and its motivations still applied. Although American imperialism was largely informal, it was nevertheless driven by the need for a ‘global open economy’ coupled with American ‘values’, or ideologies – the spread of liberal economic systems based on democratic principles that included containing the spread of communism, which led notably to the Vietnam War. American imperialism was geared towards suppressing growing nationalism in countries like Iran, Chile, Iraq, which also led in many cases to the policy of regime change in places like DR Congo with the removal of Patrice Lumumba, its attempt in Cuba and Castro and latterly in Iraq and Saddam Hussein. Given that the United States came lately to imperialism, its areas of domination were limited to the pacific nations of the Caribbean, Central America and the Far East. In his treatment of American imperialism Kohli selects the American intervention in the Philippines and Cuba for comparative study as he did with the British in India and Nigeria.
Now to the analytical part of the book where Kohli’s main argument is that economic interest was at the heart of both the British and American imperialisms, a point he repeats again and again throughout the book. ‘The evidence is overwhelming that Britain’s primary concern was economic gain’ (142); ‘British expansion overseas was driven by economic needs’ (149); ‘Of the various theories that have been developed to explain the Scramble for Africa, economic theories remain the most relevant’ (150); 'the search for economic prosperity drove both Britain and the United States to establish influence over peripheral countries of the world’ (395); ‘Britain and the United States expanded into the global periphery to enhance national economic prosperity’ (397). However, in other passages political interests emerge as part of the motive, pointing out that ‘Imperialism…involves growing control of one state over another state or people…the aim of control is to seek political and economic advantage’ (7); and the European Scramble for Africa ‘was really all about: political control to ensure sound and profitable commercial relations’ (181). Again, so far, so conventional.
The problem here is that this thesis is not new; indeed, Kohli himself concedes this point but believes he has found new ideas that chart a slightly different and important course in the study of British and American imperialisms. But I cannot see a significant difference between Kohli’s thesis and those of previous authors, only that he does not beat the drum of capitalism as loudly as Marxist theorists. My own view is that despite the limitations of Hobson’s own thesis few theories of imperialism have improved on the main arguments offered in that book. But that aside, speaking generally, the problem with some of these theories of imperialism is that they tend to lapse into causal reductionism by appearing to offer a mono-causal thesis of imperialism. Kohli is no different. His own reductionism confines imperialism mainly to economic interests, combined at different points with political factors. ‘I am partial to economic arguments’ he claims (179). Others, like Abernethy (2000) argue that the primary driver of American mission abroad has been to spread democracy. Equally, Cohen (2014) also argues that political consideration was at the heart of American imperialism.
By and large imperialism is a macro label, an umbrella term that describes a set of complex situations and circumstances that cannot be reduced to a single or even a few determining factors like economic and/or political drives. There is more to imperialism than economics and politics, notwithstanding the significance of these two factors. There are other dimensions to imperialism, meaning that we can only usefully and properly speak of imperialisms. There are corporate or multinational imperialism, religious imperialism, cultural imperialism, technological imperialism and so on, all within one sovereign dispensation. This is significant, because when assessing the impact of imperialism on the lives of the people in the global periphery, we need to take account of these dimensions that shape people’s lives down to the food they eat - that is if they eat at all, and the clothes they wear.
The second problem, which follows from the first, is that key terms are used loosely without in-depth analysis. So, we find words like ‘motive’, ‘interest’, ‘concern’ and so on used so liberally and interchangeably as though they mean the same thing as cause. Are motives causes? One may have interest in something but not be motivated by it, and vice versa; but significantly there is no necessary connection between motives, interests and actions. Without delving into the philosophical and psychological debate about whether motives constitute causes, my own view is that motives cannot be equated with causes. Besides, motives are not static but dynamic, constantly changing and evolving with new factors creeping into the determination of action. Thus, economic interests alone will not explain the imperialist force, coercion or indeed the brutality of conquest and hegemonic consolidation. Equally, nations can and do pursue economic interests without resorting to imperialism, which suggests that a multitude of factors working in concert, sometimes overlapping, are causally responsible for the rise of imperialism. So, a factor such as racism, which Kohli touches, but does not expand upon, do feature as a factor in the imperialism drive, certainly in places like Africa and indeed Asia. This is because imperial powers generally believe in the innate superiority of their culture and values and in the rightness of their policies and methods.
However, if imperialism is to be pinned down to one central defining factor, it must be power. Schumpeter (1918) has argued this point, defining imperialism as ‘the object-less disposition of a state of expansion by force without assigned limits.’ Therefore, the main driver of imperial expansionism, whether formal or informal, hard or soft, economic or political, is power. Power is the axis upon which the imperial machine turns and under which its various tentacles are subsumed. It is the means by which imperialists consolidate their near total control and domination of the lives of the imperialized. Kohli does discuss power in his analysis of imperialism, indeed, pointing out that, ‘Britain used its power superiority to build both a formal and informal empire’ (6); and ‘Force was used periodically to establish and maintain these economic interactions…’ (142). Also, ‘The use of coercion is especially significant for assessing a relationship as imperial’ (392). But so strong is the emphasis on motives (economic interest) that the significance of the concept of power or coercion is lost within the historical narrative. Indeed, in the case of the US, Kohli talks about ‘surplus power.’ We shall return to this idea of power later.
Another weakness of the book is that given Kohli’s aim is to show how British and American imperialism shaped the developing world, he does not sufficiently tackle the apologists of empire such as Ferguson (2004) whom Kohli has in his sight. ‘There seems a plausible case’, claims Ferguson, ‘that empire enhanced global welfare – in order words, was a good thing’ (xxi). But good for whom? Ferguson’s answer is that imperialism was good for the imperialized and with this claim he mounts a defence of imperialism on the grounds of what he describes as ‘the gifts of empire’. This aestheticisation of imperialism dresses the entire project in the fine colours of civilization and progress caveated by few excesses, and is a claim that required full frontal attack. Ferguson identifies nine benefits or gifts that the British Empire is supposed to have bestowed on the world, including ‘the English language, English forms of land tenure, Scottish and English Banking, The Common Law, Protestantism, Team Sports, The Limited or ‘night watchman’ state, Representative assemblies and the Idea of Liberty.’ (xxiii). Kohli appears to endorse some of these so-called benefits when he points out that ‘There is no need to deny some of the good that Western countries did on the periphery. These include the introduction of modern education, the building of infrastructure, and …the creation of the modern state structure’ (15). Few sentences later, he acknowledges that ‘imperialism seriously undermined the prospect of sustained economic growth and prosperity on the global periphery.’ So, which is it? Well, both at the same time: profits and losses. It is this belief in the positive impact of colonialism that prompted Bruce Gilley in a controversial paper ‘The Case for Colonialism’ (2017) (now withdrawn) to argue that colonialism was such a good thing for the developing world and should be re-introduced.
But this manner of assessing the impact of imperialism, based on cost benefit analysis (CBA) or a balance sheet calculation of profits and losses, is wrong-headed from the start and Kohli falls into this trap. This is because both defenders and critics of imperialism are looking at incommensurables. The balance sheet analogy supposes that the assessment of imperialism is being calculated on the same ledger, using the same measuring scale, when it is not. But if the analogy of the ledger is to be insisted upon, we must also insist on the fact that there is not one but two balance sheets: the one consisting entirely of gains with minimal loses to the imperial power while the second consists largely of losses with marginal gains to the imperialized. As Kohli explains, ‘imperialist gain from imperialism at the expense of the imperialized’, but it is within this second balance sheet (of the impact of imperialism on developing nations) that we are invited to identify benefits. This utilitarian/consequentialist argument is then infused with notions of charity and benevolence all served up as though they constituted part of the original imperial drive, when in fact imperial powers are driven to dominate, destabilize, desecrate, displace, deplete, distort and destroy and exploit, notwithstanding mitigating outcomes such as education and infrastructure. Who decides what is the greater good for developing nations and by what yardstick is the ‘good’ measured? Not only are some losses incalculable or immeasurable but they are also irrecoverable. Can a railway line really compensate for the loss of one’s culture, identity, religion and an entire way of life? As to the argument that one must concede that some good did emerge from imperialism, one could equally argue that the slave was housed, clothed and fed. The ‘gift’ of the English language supposes that languages like Swahili, Zulu, Yoruba, Hindi or Gujarat are inferior.
The arguments advanced by defenders of imperialism, which even some of its critics fail to spot is the inherent incoherence and inconsistencies in those arguments. The consequentialist calculations of imperialism pay little regard to considerations such as power and control or domination but rather emphasise outcomes, so that actions appear to be viewed in isolation or independently of their consequences. In that case cherished values such as social justice, human rights, equality, freedom, respect for the rule of law and other principles that the West hold dear are sometime disregarded, including the principle of ordo bonorum which implores that less harm be done where overall good cannot be produced. Thus, the various Bengal famines, the Amritsar and Mau Mau massacres, the Vietnam War and other atrocities are turned into acts calculated to produce not harm but a greater good. Can this be right? Which is to say that imperialism can both theoretically and practically sanction a moral wrong upon the supposition that such wrongs are for a greater good. Which leads to the paradox of modern-day imperialism that claims to spread democratic freedom and rights around the world while suppressing those very rights and freedom in other nations.
Kohli hints at but does not pursue the fact that modern imperialism has turned full circle and reverted to the imperialism of the multinationals that set British imperialism motion in the nineteenth century. Although the political dimension of sovereign and indeed global power is ‘alive and well’ as Kohli points out, it is the imperialism of the multinationals that is currently and deeply impacting the developing nations. As Smith (2016) persuasively argues, global flow of capital moves from the global south to the north, as capitalist countries through ‘global labor arbitrage’ take advantage of cheap labour in developing nations to enrich themselves and in turn impoverish workers in the global south.
We now return to power and domination and perhaps the most glaring remiss in this book is the lack of a sustained discussion of China as a global player, except as a historical subject of British and American imperialisms – opium war, Boxer rebellion. Kohli does touch on China’s expansionism but devotes only 4 pages (422-425) to it, explaining that it is ‘far too early to tell’ how China ‘fits within his theory of imperialism’. But this is only from a historical and not from an analytical perspective. China has risen and is now a global power that cannot be ignored and must be reckoned with. No doubt China regards herself as an anti-imperialist nation but her emergence as a global power presents an opportunity to test previous theories of imperialism. Is today’s China an imperial power, if so, how does her imperial expansionism compare to the British and American imperialisms of recent times; and if not, what makes it different? With China, Kohli does test his hypothesis but again believes that economic interests are also at play. Thus, the refrain of the book’s main thesis rings out in the claim that ‘the pursuit of national economic prosperity by hegemonic powers is the taproot of imperialism’ (423). No doubt that China’s tentacles now reach far, stretching from Hong Kong and Taiwan all the way to Africa and beyond, trapping many countries in a bondage of indebtedness from which they are struggling to escape. Is the Belt and Road Initiative an example of a statement of imperialism? So, while an author is free to write on any subject and from any perspective of choice; the question is why focus on historical imperialisms that have been well-covered in the literature when there is a new global power in town, shaping the world in new and important ways? The point is that what we are witnessing with China, as indeed with the British and American imperialism, is an exercise in power play, expressed in multidimensional ways that cannot be confined or reduced to, but extends beyond, economic motives. It is true that the trajectory of Chinese expansionism is still unfolding, the end of which is yet to be determined; but China is now at the epicentre of global power struggles and there is sufficient material to warrant a detailed comparative study that includes China in the new global political world order.
Finally, this is a good book, well written and reflects the labours of first-class research and the handling of sources. The historical approach is well done; but the analytical parts are weak. But perhaps the real problem is that, although the author unearths some nuggets of new information here and there, overall, the book goes over old and standard grounds that adds little to existing knowledge about imperialism.
References
Abernethy, David (2000) America’s Mission: The United States and the Struggle for Democracy. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
Cohen. Benjamin (1971[2014]) The Question of Imperialism: The Political Economy of Dominance and Dependence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ferguson, Niall (2004) Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World. London: Penguin Books.
Harvey, David (2003) The New Imperialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hardt, Michael, Negri, Anthonio (2009) Empire. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
Hilferding, Rudolf (1909[1980]) Finance Capital. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Hobson, John (1902) Imperialism: A Study. New York: James Pott and Company.
Lenin, Vladimir (1917[2016]) Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism. London: Wellred Books.
Luxembourg, Rosa (1913[2015) The Accumulation of Capital. London: Routledge
Schumpeter, Joseph (1918[1955]) Imperialism and Social Classes. New York: Meridian Books.
Smith, John (2016) Imperialism in the Twenty-First Century: Globalization, Super-Exploitation, and the Crisis of Capitalism. New York: Monthly Review Press
Gabriel O. Apata is a research scholar and writer whose works cut across the humanities and social sciences. His interests include Philosophy, Aesthetics, Religion, Post-colonial Studies, African history and politics and Diaspora Studies.
